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Abstract
In recent decades we have seen an exponential growth in the amount of data gathered
within psychological research without a corresponding growth of theory that could
meaningfully organize these research findings. For this reason, considerable attention
today is given to discussions of such broader, higher-order concepts as theory and
paradigm. However, another area important to consider is the nature of the questions
psychologists are asking. Key to any discussion about the scientific status of psychol-
ogy or about progress in the field (scientific or otherwise) is the nature of the questions
that inspire psychological research. Psychologists concerned about scientific progress
and the growth of theory in the field would be well served by more robust conversa-
tions about the nature of the questions being asked. Honest, curiosity-driven
questions—questions that admit to our ignorance and that express an active and
optimistic yearning for what we do not yet know—can help to propel psychology
forward in a manner similar to the development of theory or paradigm. However,
existing as it does in the “twilight zone” between the natural sciences and the human-
ities, psychology is fertile ground for questions of wide-ranging natures, and thus the
nature of progress in the field can be variously understood, not all of which will be
“scientific.” Recent psychological research in three areas (cognition, memory, and
disorders/differences of sex development) are discussed as examples of how
curiosity-driven questions being asked from a position of informed ignorance can lead
to progress in the field.
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Introduction
It is “the right question, asked the right way, rather than the accumulation of more data,
that allows a field to progress.” (Firestein 2012, p. 98)
In recent decades we have seen an exponential growth in the amount of data gathered
within psychological research. Study after study is conducted to test various hypotheses,
and yet in psychology at large there is little consensus regarding the core concepts in use,
and there is a general absence of broader theories or overarching paradigms that would
allow for the meaningful organization of research findings (Valsiner 2017; Zagaria et al.
2020). For this reason, considerable attention today is given to discussions of such
broader or higher-order concepts as theory and paradigm, and rightly so. Within such
discussions, some psychologists have argued that the field would be well served by
adopting an inclusive, pluralistic, “meta-theory,” such as evolutionary psychology
(Zagaria et al. 2020). The main aim of the current piece is to suggest that, before looking
for unifying (“scientific”) theories, psychologists interested in the scientific progress of
the field should look into the nature of the questions being asked and the degree to which
those questions open the door to the possibility of scientific progress in the first place.
We will examine some characteristics of the kinds of questions that allow for the
possibility of scientific progress, and we will briefly look at some areas in psychology
in which we see such questions being asked. Much psychological work—valid and
valuable psychological work—is not scientific, and much good work would be difficult
to link with any notion of progress in the field, scientific or otherwise. For many
psychologists, and within a considerable amount of psychological work, the “soft”
status of the field is not a concern. Thus, before we can assess the potential merits of
various meta-theories, it would seem to be important that we first ask if we are generally
studying psychology in a manner that is suggestive of a collective, scientific undertak-
ing, and thus one in which inclusive, pluralistic, meta-theories would potentially be of
use. By examining the nature of our questions, we can explore the degree to which the
practices of psychologists point towards the possibility of various versions of scientific
progress in the field, or perhaps in different, non-scientific directions.
As assessed along a number of metrics (e.g., the theories-to-laws ratio, the rate of
consultation between researchers in the field, citation frequency of new researchers,
citation concentration), psychology is considered a “soft science” relative to the natural
sciences (Zagaria et al. 2020). In addition to these factors, the soft status of psychology
also arises from the nature of the questions that give impetus to psychological research.
In as far as those questions are curiosity-driven—which is to say that they profess an
“informed ignorance” and an honest curiosity about the world—they afford us a way to
meaningfully assess progress (scientific or otherwise). Honest, curiosity-driven ques-
tions are both a confession of ignorance and a profession of openness to the as-yet-
unknown that lies beyond. “Thoroughly conscious ignorance is the prelude to every
real advance in science” (James Clerk Maxwell quoted in Firestein 2012, p. 7).
While reflecting on the nature of particular questions or of questions in general can
feel philosophically naïve or overwhelmingly complicated in turn, the matter is worth
raising here in this brief piece as in practice psychologists rarely explicitly engage in
such reflection. Psychologists rarely, in practice, publicly profess ignorance, and do so
even more rarely as a badge of honor, as an assertion of hope, as a rallying cry. Rather
than reflecting on the sense of wonder that can appear in our ignorance, psychologists
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often in effect seem to want themselves and others to wonder at what is already known.
Rather than exploring the unknown, psychologists focus more on the methods we use
to get to know it, and the theories we hope to developed to know it better. By focusing
exceedingly on issues of method, methodology, hypothesis, theory, or goals,
psychologists often lose sight of the object of study, and in the process the curiosity
driving our questions about the world often becomes of secondary importance. Unless
we are pushed forward by our ignorance and curiosity, and allow ourselves to be pulled
forward by what we find outside of ourselves in response, the scientific status of
psychology will remain standing on what Zagaria et al. (2020) call “clay feet.” The
question of psychology’s scientific status and the possibilities of scientific progress in
the field pertain not so much to whether or not psychology can stand on its own, as
whether or not it has anywhere to go.
Progress Arising from Informed Ignorance
The notion of progress in science is both exceedingly popular and particularly slippery
(e.g., Debrock and Hulswit 1994; Laudan 1978). Our current understanding of scientific
progress developed in theWest over the past several centuries, and has been understood in
several different ways over that time (for a particularly helpful explication of that history,
see Harrison 2015). In as far as we can speak of science centuries ago, the idea of scientific
progress was initially understood as the perennially new, individual-level cultivation of
internal virtue with the assistance of a semiotically pregnant world (as in Aquinas’s
understanding of scientia). More recently, it has come to be seen as a linear, collective-
level accumulation of external, objective data from a mechanistic world. The philosopher
Charles Taylor (2007) refers to these changes as part of the shift from an “enchanted” to a
“disenchanted”world. Over the course of this transition, science came to be understood as
an endeavor divorced from other areas of knowledge, such as those found in the
humanities and the arts (Daston and Galison 2007). For many, science has come to be
seen not just as a method, but also a philosophy; a shift that others find problematic (e.g.,
Sheen 2019). Psychology emerged as an independent field in the nineteenth century
during a particularly intense period of this transition, and debates regarding psychology’s
academic allegiances were there from the very beginning (Rzepa and Dobroczyński 2019;
Valsiner 2012). Much like the historical development of nationally-conscious languages
whose promotors made decisions regarding phonetics, grammar, and lexicon so as to
differentiate their languages from those of neighboring peoples (Snyder 2003), psychol-
ogists worked very hard to distance the field from thosewith which it was themost similar,
particularly philosophy (e.g., as seen in the work of Gustav Fechner on “psychophysics,”
in the famous laboratory of Wilhelm Wundt, or in the intellectual development and
interesting career path of Władysław Heinrich between psychology, philosophy, and
pedagogy; Danziger 1990; Rzepa and Dobroczyński 2019). Many early psychologists
fought to steer psychology in the direction of the natural sciences, and in doing so, largely
adopted a “disenchanted” understanding of progress.
Closely related to the notion of scientific progress, and similarly complex, is an
activity that also appears at first glance to be patently simple, namely, asking questions
(Firestein 2012). The nature of the questions we ask about the world gives shape to the
nature of our scientific theories. Similarly, our broader understandings of the world give
shape to the questions we ask. Thus, questions can be thought of as containing both
Integr Psych Behav (2020) 54:613–624 615
deductive and inductive elements (and constituting a “chicken or egg” dilemma).
Amidst the intellectual battles accompanying the historical “disenchantment” of the
world, nineteenth century social scientists were well aware of how the questions we pose
are expressions not only of what we don’t know, but also of our intellectual allegiances
to existing schools of thought (e.g., Sheen 2019). For example, Auguste Comte (1798–
1857) wanted the new field of “social physics” (later “sociology”) to be a purely
“scientific” endeavor, free frommetaphysical or philosophical musings. In its allegiance
to empirical science and its rejection of metaphysics, Comte’s positivism finds expres-
sion in the questions he believed social scientists should ask and therefore “takes the
terrestrial horizon as its boundary, without prejudice to what might lie beyond it.
Abandoning too high a level of speculation, it retired to lowlier positions of more
immediate interest” (de Lubac 1995, p. 159). Thus, in the writings of many early social
scientists—academics who were acutely aware that the intellectual allegiances and
academic independence of their newly emerging fields were in doubt—we see a clear
awareness that questions come in all shapes and sizes, and that not all questions are
equal regarding the direction in which they propel us (moral and value judgments aside)
(Sehon 2005). They were aware that it is not only important to ask questions, but also
that it is important to ask questions about the questions we are asking.
Curiosity-Driven Questions
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It is not easy to ask meaningful questions, but doing so is of fundamental importance
for the advance of any scientific field. Neurobiologist, Stuart Firestein (2012), has
argued that within the natural sciences it is “the right question, asked the right way,
rather than the accumulation of more data, that allows a field to progress” (p. 98). In as
far as we see its status as a “soft science” as problematic, we can say that psychology,
on the whole, is struggling to ask meaningful questions in the right way, that is, in a
way that would allow for scientific progress to be made. In as far as psychology can be
considered a science or even an academic pursuit, it is important that psychologists
reflect on the questions being asked in the field. Asking honest questions indicates an
awareness of our ignorance, as well as a curiosity about what lies beneath.
We have been long aware of differences in quality between the questions we ask.
For example, C. S. Peirce (1958) argued that real questions arise from genuine, “living”
doubt, not what he calls “paper doubts,” that is, questions that arise from the compul-
sive need to ask questions—as often found among academics—rather than from honest
curiosity and an awareness of one’s own ignorance. “According to Peirce, the doubt
that brings forth inquiry must be genuine. It is not sufficient to say or write that one
doubts; ‘paper doubt’ does not amount to legitimate disbelief” (Bergman 2009, p. 16).
With this distinction in mind, we can also see that there is a subtle, but fundamental,
difference between curiosity-driven questions and hypothesis testing. While not mutu-
ally exclusive, and ideally complementary, in practice hypothesis testing often over-
shadows genuine questions in psychological research. Not only is there the overwhelm-
ing pressure in academia to publish “significant findings,” but those findings are
generally expected to confirm the initial hypotheses. Within published psychological
research there are few surprises. This applies to both quantitative and qualitative
research (even in the absence of explicit hypotheses, as is often the case of the latter).
In this climate, unsurprisingly, psychologists often become cheerleaders for their own
hypotheses (or general expectations). Additional theoretical, political, professional, and
social biases also abound (Campbell and Manning 2018; Duarte et al. 2015; Ferguson
and Heene 2012; Gerber et al. 2001), making the majority of research presented in
published articles or at conferences thoroughly predictable. While hypothesis testing
can be helpful to the extent that it contains within itself the mechanisms for assessing
“significance” and thereby for meaningfully judging outcomes, it is unhelpful to the
extent that we favor an outcome before the fact. Thoroughly conscious ignorance
requires the meaningful assessment of research outcomes, as afforded by hypothesis
testing, but also an openness to, and genuine curiosity of, those outcomes. If the
outcomes are essentially contained within the hypotheses, and known in advance, the
process is not future oriented, and no progress can be made. Having lost sight of the
tension within every honest question between what is known and what is unknown,
hypotheses in psychology are often, in practice, rhetorical questions.
Another relatively small, but not unimportant, indicator of this can be found in the
questions that appear in the limitations section at the end of research articles (rather than
lying at the core of the work). What is more, the limitations or suggestions for future
research are often actually backhanded suggestions in support of the given claims (e.g.,
usually by suggesting extensions or replications). Such practices in effect anchor psycho-
logical questions to the past and to the already-known, rather than projecting them into the
future and the as-yet-unknown. In as far as we root for a hypothesis, and do so at the
expense of genuine, curiosity-driven questions, we run the risk of silencing the data and
ignoring the subject. This can also happen when our constructs are too rigidly defined,
indicating that a lack of universal agreement about even core constructs in the field is not
necessarily a bad thing, that is, as long as this flexibility allows us to turn meaningfully to
the data, or rather, to the subject under study. In fact, intentionally loosening up on widely
held definitions can shift priority from the researcher and the past (the known), to the
subject and the future (the as-yet-unknown), and yet, “That principle is one that is difficult
for many scientists to swallow, because it relaxes control, gets the experimenter out of the
driver’s seat, and leaves it up to the subjects […] to produce the results” (Firestein 2012, p.
97). The generative quality of honest questions, as well as the thorough excitement and
deep discomfort that such inquiry can cause, is wonderfully expressed in the following
statement made by Robert Boyle (1627–1691):
“…an Inquisitive Naturalist finds his work to increase daily upon his hands, and the
event of his past Toils, whether it be good or bad, does but engage him into new ones,
either to free himself from his scruples, or improve his successes. So, that, though the
pleasure of making Physical Discoveries, is, in it self consider’d, very great; yet this does
not a little impair it, that the same attempts which afford that delight, do so frequently beget
both anxious Doubts, and a disquieting Curiosity.” (quoted in Hunter 2000, p. 13).
Criteria for Judging the Data
Since at least the times of ancient Greece we have been wrestling with the “dilemma of
dualism,” i.e., how it is that the seeker of knowledge can come to know that which is
unknown (Debrock and Hulswit 1994). How can one recognize that which one has never
yet seen? While not resolving this age-old riddle, we can recognize that asking questions
presupposes the ability to assess the meaningfulness of what one hears in response. It
presupposes the (at least partial) intelligibility of what follows the question; it presumes the
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ability to see in a response an answer. In this sense, questions contain broader conceptu-
alizations that meaningfully combine individual data. While grounded in what we already
know (or think we know), asking curiosity-driven questions is also essentially about the
future and our confident movement into that future (Firestein 2012; Valsiner 2017).
Honest, curiosity-driven questions—questions that admit to our ignorance and that
express an active yearning for what we do not yet know—can help to propel psychology
forward in a manner similar to the development of theory or paradigm. The advances that
we see in the natural sciences have come from the ability of scientists in those fields to ask
honest, curiosity-driven questions and to meaningfully judge the various responses they
get from the natural world in reply. Answered questions inspire new questions, more data
are gathered, theories and paradigms emerge to meaningfully organize and compare the
“answers” we have found, and the march of progress is set afoot. Such progress is seen
relatively rarely in psychology, at least in part, because of the nature of the questions being
asked. The range of questions asked by psychologists reflects the wide range of episte-
mological and ontological positions professed in the field. For example, broadly speaking,
there are psychologists who understand psychology to be an empirical, experimental
science (e.g., “all psychology must be based on experiment, and that it is quite improper
to set aside an area of study labeled ‘experimental’ as if to suggest that other areas of
psychology exist which are not experimental”; Bugelski 1951), just as there are those who
believe it can never be an empirical science (e.g., “an objective, accumulative, empirical
and theoretical science of psychology is an impossible project”; Smedslund 2016, p. 185).
These two broad camps exist, and will continue to exist, convinced of the value of their
enterprise (Mazur and Watzlawik 2016). Gustaw Ichheiser (1897–1969) saw this funda-
mental tension not as an impasse, but as an opportunity: “[S]ocial scientists should, in my
opinion, not aspire to be as ‘scientific’ and ‘exact’ as physicists or mathematicians, but
should cheerfully accept the fact that what they are doing belongs to the twilight zone
between science and literature” (cited in Rudmin et al. 1987, p. 171).
Psychology belongs to this twilight zone in part because the body of criteria
psychologists use for perceiving data as answers to their questions is broad, inclusive,
and often shifting—and arguably more so than in other fields. While literary scholars
generally do not use “scientific” criteria to study literature, and physicists generally do
not use the judgement criteria of literature within physics, psychologists more readily
and more often shift between the criteria associated with one or the other of what C. P.
Snow (1959) called “the two cultures” (i.e., the sciences and the humanities). While
many, such as Ichheiser, see this as a strength of psychology, it is also arguably
responsible for a considerable degree of confusion (Kagan 2009). Although the general
conceptual separation of the “two cultures” is a relatively recent historical development
(Harrison 2015), and one that many have argued is not as clear-cut even today as may
appear (Gould 2003; McAllister 1996; Sullivan 1933), in as far as we give credence to
this and similar distinctions between fields of study, we ought to take seriously the
differences in judgment criteria both between and within fields. This is particularly
important within psychology precisely because psychologists often oscillate between
various judgment criteria, none of which has primacy within the field. Judging the
meaningfulness of data involves the tension between the restrictiveness of judgment
criteria that focus our vision and an openness of those criteria so as to not lose sight of
their limitations relative to the object of study, however, this essential tension can lose
its “bite” if one can in effect shape that balance at will.
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As suggested by Ichheiser and others, flexibility in method and methodology within
psychology can be a strength, that is, as long as it opens up new avenues for fruitfully
studying the subject. After all, polyvalence is understood to be part of our psychological
lives (Boesch 1991). However, there is a double-sided risk that comes with this flexibility.
On the one hand, we can switch between judgment criteria too often and too easily, thereby
ultimately devaluing what the subject says to us in our research; after all, criteria for
determining “significance” (quantitative or otherwise) are ultimately intended to serve our
ability to perceive the subject in ways that would otherwise be unavailable to us. On the
other hand, we can swing too far in the other direction, becoming too wedded to any one
judgment criteria over others, thereby undercutting the richness of our conceptual toolkit
and, more importantly, of the subject. When facing the complexities of the world, judgment
criteria are helpful precisely because they allow us to perceive the world, to perceive the
subject, in ways that would otherwise have escaped our awareness. Balance in the use of
judgment criteria saves us from both “trivial order” and “barbaric vagueness”; from the
“extremes of premature closure and narrow-mindedness on the one hand, and interminable
indecision and ‘broadmindedness’ on the other” (Aeschliman 1983, p. 69–71). To simplify
matters somewhat, we see this balancing act illustrated in the tension that often emerges in
psychology between qualitatively-minded researchers and quantitatively-minded re-
searchers. Qualitatively-minded researchers often criticize quantitative, experimental re-
search as being overly restrictive or even closed to the subject (“forcing the subject into
the empirical methods”), while quantitatively-minded researchers often criticize qualitative
research as usingweak or “wishy-washy” criteria for evaluating the subject. By holding onto
our techniques too tightly, we ignore other options, overlook the limits of method, and
ultimately restrict potential discoveries. By letting go too much of such criteria, we ignore
the power of those techniques and thuswe deny the subject the chance to speak to us through
them. By either overly restricting or overly expanding our criteria we in effect lose sight of
the subject.
Examples of Curiosity-Driven Questions
To suggest that we reflect more on the nature of the questions we ask, or to suggest the value
of curiosity-driven questions for psychological science, is not to suggest the value of any
concrete question(s) in particular. What is more, given the nature of curiosity-driven
questions arising from informed ignorance, it is impossible to identify such questions on
face value (that is, on the basis of any particular wording). In other words, while we have
been referring to this as a “question,” or rather a type of question, it is in reality more of an
approach or practice. Just as the question “Why am I sick?” can be scientific, moral,
rhetorical, etc. (Sehon 2005), any particular motivating question posed by psychologists
can be of various natures. Similarly, as curiosity-driven questions are defined by their relation
to informed ignorance and their receptiveness to the subject, they necessarily extend in time
and space beyond what we usually think of as the question itself. Thus, any example of such
a question would need to explore the foundations provided by informed ignorance and the
manner in which the question indicates a responsiveness to the subject (and the “data”). For
this reason it is perhaps more accurate to think of them as research practices or processes.
An example of such a process can be seen in psychological research on conscious-
ness. The notion of consciousness is of fundamental importance within psychology, but
also in broader, non-academic discussions. It is also one of those often used, but
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incredibly “fuzzy,” concepts within the field (Zagaria et al. 2020). One area of research
within this general topic concerns whether non-human animals have what we call
consciousness. As we remain somewhat unsure about just exactly what this term
means, it is particularly difficult to look for it empirically. However, as researchers
have learned to let go of their “human biases” and listened to their non-human subjects,
they have expanded their view on how consciousness might “look” in non-human
animals and how we might study it there (Firestein 2012). For example, rather than
expecting consciousness to appear like a conversation between two adult humans,
researchers have been making strong claims for the presence of consciousness in a
wide range of animals (e.g., Plotnik et al. 2010). In a related line of research, work on
theory of mind (ToM) continues to produce new tests to identify the appearance and
development of such elements of consciousness in children at various ages
(Jakubowska and Bialecka-Pikul 2020; Wellman et al. 2001). This has required
researchers to in effect stop thinking like adult scientists and to start thinking like
younger and younger children. By listening to how children see and interact with the
world, psychologists have come to better understand the development of the perception
of mental states, both one’s own and those of others. In the case of both children and
animals, psychologists have been asking questions out of a position of informed
ignorance and they have been listening to their subjects. As a result, not only is it
fairly safe to say that progress has been made, but new questions have emerged, and
continue to emerge, as a result. Such research also builds the collective body of
knowledge on the subject, a hallmark of modern science (Harrison 2015), and such
curiosity towards the subject makes the research of others relevant, especially more
recent research—another hallmark of “hard” science (Zagaria et al. 2020).
Another area of research that constitutes a nice example of the kinds of questions
here under consideration concerns the nature of memory. Psychologists have been
interested in the nature of memory since the very beginnings of the field. When looking
across the history of memory research, hiccups and oddities aside, one would be hard-
pressed to defend the position that progress has not been made, even “scientific”
progress. Across a wide range of research methodologies and methods, a diverse group
of researchers have expanded our knowledge of the complex, plastic, and dynamic
nature of memory (e.g., Lamprecht and LeDoux 2004). Researchers have been open to
their subject(s) and as a result, have come to suggest radical changes to our conceptu-
alizations of memory, or rather, memories (Bourtchouladze 2004). That the issue of
memory continues to puzzle and fascinate researchers indicates not the scientific failure
of the field, but the expansive, generative nature of honest inquiry.
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Another example can be seen in research over the past several decades on gender
within cases of “Disorders/Differences of Sex Development” (DSD; formerly called
intersex, hermaphroditism, pseudohermaphroditism, sex errors of the body, or ambig-
uous genitalia). DSD should not be confused with what is known as “gender dysphoria”
(APA 2013), that is, cases in which a person believes their gender identity to not match
their biological sex or the gender to which they were assigned. DSDs have been defined
as “congenital conditions in which development of chromosomal, gonadal, or anatom-
ical sex is atypical” (Lee et al. 2006). Cases of DSD challenge traditional thinking
regarding gender identity development by showing that such development is complex,
involving numerous prenatal and postnatal factors. For example, someone could be born
with 46,XY chromosomes (i.e., a male karyotype), internal testes and no internal female
reproductive organs, but female appearing external genitalia. Such a person is likely to
be assigned a female at birth and/or thought of as female by their family, thereby
beginning a process of female gender identity development which is discordant with
their chromosomal and gonadal status. What is more, in the presence of complete
androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS), such an individual may come to further
develop an external female phenotype (e.g., developing breasts). Similarly, there is a
large and growing body of research on “classical” congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH)
in individuals with a 46,XX karyotype, wherein these individuals show marked hor-
mone abnormalities (e.g., related to androgens), which result in various forms and
degrees of “masculinization” (Meyer-Bahlburg 2014). DSDs raise fascinating questions
regarding the nature of gender, not to mentioning the countless other areas of life
connected thereto (e.g., sexual attraction, sexual functioning, reproduction, various
non-sexual behavioral patterns, self-image, cognitive functioning, and mental health).
Scientific knowledge regarding various DSDs has increased over the past several
decades (e.g., Lee et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2016), as has our understanding of the
biological, psychosocial, and cultural factors that contribute to what we generally call
gender, including “gendered behavior” and “gender identity” (Meyer-Bahlburg 2014).
By better understanding DSDs in particular, we are able to better understand gender in
general. What is more, not only does there remain a great wealth of ignorance in this
area from which curiosity-driven questions can arise, but the more “informed” that
ignorance becomes, the more curiosity-driven questions emerge. However, psycholog-
ical research in this areas is not only concerned with scientific progress, as generally
understood, but also with issues related to such matters as quality of life, quality of
relationships, purpose, sense of self, and personal growth, issues which may or may not
be what we would often consider “scientific” considerations. What is more, there is also
a considerable and growing amount of activism related to DSDs. Progress can mean
different things to different people working in this field. In other words, in cases of
DSD (as elsewhere in psychology, including work on consciousness and memory), the
questions psychologists ask are not necessarily those that lead to scientific progress. In
fact, psychological work in this area is often clearly non-scientific. There also remains
considerable disagreement regarding just what the science is supposed to say beyond
the realms of method. Taken together, this is an example of the “twilight zone” of
which Ichheiser spoke and with which he was both comfortable and confident.
Within research on all three of the areas discussed above we not only find strong claims
that scientific progress has beenmade, but also strong claims that a considerable portion of
psychological work is not scientific. What is more, there are also disagreements about the
ways in which, or the degree to which, science can, or should, inform other areas of our
lives. Again, this is not a judgement regarding the value of scientific or non-scientific
work, but merely to point out the existence of differing undertakings within the field. One
such division can be found between the assertion of the known that we see in advocacy
and the assertion of the unknown that we see in science. Much has been written about the
complex relationship between science and advocacy, and it is a topic that extends well
beyond the scope of the current piece. However, for practical purposes it is worth
reflecting on a basic difference between science and advocacy, even if that involves
somewhat stereotyped and simplified images of both. Broadly speaking, while advocacy
involves the promotion of what we know, or think we know, science promotes our
ignorance and directs us towards what we do not yet know—and it does so again and
Integr Psych Behav (2020) 54:613–624 621
again. Advocacy can stymie scientific progress by restricting what can and cannot be
asked, by pushing an agenda regardless of what research might be produced—in other
words, by restricting our access to the subject. However, advocacy can also encourage
researchers to pose new, curiosity-driven questions that are responsive to the subject. Just
as advocacy can inspire or restrict science, science can both support and/or hamper
advocacy. There is no inherent moral value to this conflict, as science and advocacy can
work both wonders and horrors. While the intertwining natures of science and advocacy is
certainly much more complex than this, this distinction remains of considerable practical
use, especially when looking at the questions that drive psychological work.
The point here is that if we listen closely to the questions psychologists ask today we
will often hear many different theoretical positions and numerous fundamentally
different understandings of progress (e.g., see the questions posed by 33 “influential
psychologists” in APA 2018). In that regard, such distinctions as the science/advocacy
difference (among others) remain of practical utility, at least in as far as psychologists
are concerned with the scientific development of the field, or with progress in the field
(however defined). As discussed above, within discussions of the scientific status of
psychology it is worth reflecting on the assumptions contained in the questions posed,
the degree to which they are future-oriented, and the degree to which they are
responsive to, and receptive of, the subject. At the same time, not all meaningful and
valuable questions need to lay the foundations for scientific progress, or any kind of
progress for that matter (e.g., Sehon 2005). Nevertheless, questions remain of funda-
mental importance for science and for the notion of progress, scientific or otherwise.
Conclusion
Ideally, theory both grounds us in what we know and propels us into the unknown. In
light of this, it is certainly worth reflecting on, and attempting to readjust, the current
imbalance in psychology between data and theory. At the same time, it is worth
examining another important part of the research process, namely, the nature of our
questions. What is it that captures our genuine wonder? Where does the recognition of
our ignorance simultaneously evoke a belief that we can overcome it? It is there that we
find the liminal space between the known and the as-yet-unknown; it is there that we can
being to meaningfully trace potential progress and to identify the nature of that progress
(not all of which will be “scientific” as currently understood). In our concern for the
progress of “psychological science,” it is worth reflecting on the potentially progressive
quality of our questions. Do they reflect an honest curiosity about the world? Are they
boldly expressive and humbly receptive? To the extent that they balance between the
known and the unknown, and between the “trivial order” and the “barbaric vagueness”
of the given field, it is important that we recognize that not all questions are equal.
Questions come in a wide range of types and they serve all sorts of ends, not all of which
bespeak the possibility of scientific progress as currently understood. This is not in itself
problematic, far from it. Yet, for psychologists concerned with the scientific status of the
field or with the possibility of its progress as an empirical science, it is worth asking if
our questions provide fertile ground for the notion of such progress in the first place.
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